Nicholas Wolterstorff
Noah Porter Professor of Philosophical Theology Emeritus, Yale University, and long-time professor of philosophy at Calvin College
In the last week of February, three documents concerning the current financial crisis of Calvin College were made public: a letter from the Board of Trustees, a summary by the college president of the report and recommendations of the Financial Review Task Force that he had appointed, and a brief personal letter from the president of the college. In the light of these three documents I offer some brief reflections on truth, disappointment, regret, apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation. (Yes, if read aloud that’s a mouthful!)
A bit of the crisis is due to negative developments in which the college had no role — a substantial increase in the cost of employee health insurance, for example. I want to discuss only the main causes of the crisis, namely, the cost over-runs on building projects and the investments that were made in recent years.
Three possibilities come to mind as to the nature of those cost over-runs and investments. First, the over-runs and investments were prudent; but Calvin, like most colleges and universities, experienced the effects of the recession. Second, the over-runs and investments were risky and exhibited poor judgment; but nobody is morally culpable. Third, the over-runs and investments were morally irresponsible; they were a betrayal of the fiduciary trust placed by the Christian Reformed Church and by the supporters of the college in the administration and board of the college.
In previous communications from the president the investments were described as “risky.” The word “risky” does not occur in any of the three documents I have mentioned, nor is any other word used to characterize the cost over-runs and investments; they are described in purely analytic, factual language.
Let us consider the three possibilities I mentioned. The first possibility is that the over-runs and investments were prudent, and the cause of the college’s financial crisis is that Calvin has been suffering the effects of the recession. If that is the actual state of affairs, then the appropriate attitude on the part of the college and its supporters is disappointment — disappointment that the economy went into recession and that, as a consequence, the college is in financial crisis.
Everybody to whom I have talked who understands what was going on thinks that at least some of the cost over-runs and investments were in fact risky and exhibited poor judgment; they do not think that everything was done prudently and that the college is simply suffering the effects of the recession. So let us consider the second possibility mentioned, that the cost over-runs and investments were risky and exhibited poor judgment, but that no moral culpability is involved.
The three documents mentioned don’t commit themselves one way or another on the issue of whether moral culpability was involved on the part of those responsible for the over-runs and investments. It is my own judgment that they also do not tell us enough about what happened to enable us to make up our own minds on the matter. (Those who are more financially astute than I am may think I am mistaken about that.)
It is noteworthy that in its letter the board also acknowledges no blameworthiness on its part. It says that “stronger board oversight may have detected the issues earlier” and that “in hindsight the board would have greatly benefited from having the detail of information we have today.” This falls short, obviously, of saying that the board ought to have had stronger oversight.
It appears to me that the board can in fact be blamed for failure to exercise due oversight. But let us suppose that it cannot be blamed or faulted. And let us suppose that the poor judgments of those responsible for making the cost over-run and investment decisions were likewise non-culpable. Let us suppose, in short, that there was no wrongdoing on anyone’s part. Mistakes in judgment and neglect of oversight, yes; but no wrongdoing. Whether or not that is true, the college has been harmed, grievously harmed, by those mistakes and by that neglect.
Given this harm to the college, what is the appropriate response on the part of those responsible for the over-run and investment decisions, and what is the appropriate response on the part of the board for its neglect of due oversight? I would say that the appropriate response in both cases is a public expression of deep regret by these officials for the crisis caused by their mistakes and neglect, and an offer to aid the college in whatever way they can in its crisis. Not some general sort of regret for what happened, but regret specifically for their role in bringing about the crisis.
Consider the counterpart situation in a family. Johnny carelessly trips Ruth, who now lies sprawled on the sidewalk, bleeding and crying. What should Johnny do? He should help her get up and should say, “I’m sorry I tripped you; I didn’t mean to.” Suppose he does neither of these. Suppose further that a parent has witnessed the entire episode. The parent then says, “Johnny, help Ruth get up and say you’re sorry you tripped her.” Johnny replies, “But I didn’t mean it.” The parent replies, “I know you didn’t mean it; but that doesn’t matter. Help her get up and say you’re sorry you tripped her.”
Suppose Johnny refuses to do either of these: refuses to help Ruth get up and refuses to say he’s sorry he tripped her. Then we have a new situation on our hands. Now Ruth is being wronged by Johnny’s cold-hearted refusal. Johnny was not morally culpable for tripping Ruth; that was accidental. But he is now morally culpable for his hard-hearted refusal to help her get up and for his refusal to say, “I’m sorry I tripped you; I didn’t mean to.” Ruth was not wronged by being tripped; but she is now wronged by Johnny’s refusal to help her get up and to say he’s sorry.
I am led to the conclusion that if the board, and those in the previous administration responsible for the cost over-runs and investment decisions, offer no public expression of regret and do nothing to come to the aid of the college in its crisis, then we have a new situation. Though not culpable for having caused the crisis, they are now culpable for expressing no public regret and for doing nothing to come to the aid of the college. (It’s possible that, without the knowledge of the public, they have in some way come to the aid of the college.)
We can consider what should be done in the case of such culpability by moving on to the third of the three possibilities I mentioned: those who made the cost over-run and investment decisions acted irresponsibly; they are morally culpable for doing what they did, blameworthy. And the board is culpable for not having exercised due oversight. In this case, the college and its supporters have been wronged, morally wronged, both by those who made the over-run and investment decisions and by the board for its neglect of due oversight.
When someone wrongs someone, what is the appropriate response on the part of the wrongdoer? Admission of guilt, expression of repentance, an offer of restitution if restitution is possible, and a plea for forgiveness. And what is the appropriate response, by the person who was wronged, to these actions by the wrongdoer? Forgiveness is the appropriate response.
Forgiveness is not forgetting what was done to one. Neither is forgiveness changing one’s mind and concluding that one was not wronged after all. The person who forgives remembers what was done to her, remembers who did it, and continues to condemn it. Neither is forgiveness excusing. We excuse someone if we conclude that he is not culpable for what he did because it was an accident, because he didn’t realize what he was doing and couldn’t be expected to have realized, and so forth. Forgiving someone for what he did assumes that he is culpable for what he did, not excusable.
So what then is forgiveness, if it is neither forgetting, nor excusing, nor concluding that one was not wronged after all? As I see it, forgiveness consists of not holding the wrong against the wrongdoer in one’s future engagements with that person, while nonetheless continuing to remember and condemn the wrong he did to one.
The question that invariably arises here is, shouldn’t we forgive the person who wronged us even if there is no admission of wrongdoing or expression of repentance on his part? Let’s be sure we understand the question. The question is not whether we should be willing to forgive the wrongdoer when he admits wrongdoing and expresses repentance. Of course we should. The question is, should we actually forgive the unrepentant wrongdoer?
Let me first say that I know of no place in Scripture in which we are told to forgive even the unrepentant wrongdoer, nor do I know of any place in Scripture where it says that God forgives even the person who remains steadfastly unrepentant.
Whenever I have made this claim in some public talk, always in the question period afterward someone who knows his Bible has objected by quoting to me the words of Jesus on the cross: “Father, forgive them [i.e., those responsible for his crucifixion], for they know not what they are doing” (Luke 23:34).
I submit that rather than using this passage as a proof-text for the thesis that we should forgive even those who are unrepentant, we should hear it as saying something very strange. If someone doesn’t realize what he has done, we excuse him; we don’t regard him as culpable. And if he’s not culpable, forgiveness is not in the picture. Let me say it again: excusing is not forgiving. Excusing is incompatible with forgiving.
The Greek verb translated as “forgive” in Luke 23:34 is aphes, this being an imperative of the verb aphiêmi. Anyone who consults his Greek-English dictionary will discover that aphiêmi has a wide range of meanings, including, indeed, “to forgive,” but also including, “not to hold against.” I submit that it is a mistake to translate what Jesus said as, “Father, forgive them, for they know not what they are doing.” That makes no sense. The Greek should be translated as, “Father, do not hold it against them.”
It’s relevant here to note that in the speech of Peter recorded in Acts 3 Peter says “And now, friends, I know that you acted in ignorance, as did also your rulers” (3:17). And in Acts 7:60 Stephen, at his stoning, says, “Lord, do not hold this sin against them.” (The verb here is an imperative of istêmi).
It’s true, of course, that even if Scripture nowhere says that we should forgive even the unrepentant wrongdoer, it may still be the case that we should. There’s a lot that could be said on this topic. I myself think that it is extremely difficult really to forgive an unrepentant wrongdoer; almost invariably, if the wrongdoer remains unrepentant, what one does instead is play down the seriousness of the wrong, or try to forget it and move on.
But let that pass. The main point of forgiveness is to achieve reconciliation. In the absence of repentance, there can be no reconciliation. Even if it’s possible to forgive the unrepentant wrongdoer, forgiveness in such a case loses its main point. It does not lead to reconciliation. One can try to forget, so that resentment no longer festers; one can try to get on with things. Sometimes forgetting is the best one can do. But to forget is not to be reconciled.
The college has offered an analytic description of the cost over-runs and investments that were made; but it declines to reveal who is responsible for having done what. To do that, it says, would be to reveal “personnel” matters that should not be made public. Perhaps such secrecy is for the best; I don’t know. But it should not be overlooked that it carries a significant cost. If those who had a role in the over-run and investment decisions that were made do not themselves step forward to acknowledge their role and to express either regret or repentance, and if the board expresses neither regret nor repentance for its failure of due oversight, then there can be no reconciliation. Many supporters of the college will continue to feel bruised and angry. Others may decide that it’s best to put what happened out of mind and get on with things. Over the long haul, widespread amnesia may set in. But there is no reconciliation. As of this posting (March 7, 2013), only one person from the previous administration has stepped forward to acknowledge her role and to apologize, Shirley Hoogstra, Vice President for Student Life.
In the absence of reconciliation, the best one can hope for is that the president and the board jointly take steps to forestall this sort of calamity from happening in the future. The letter from the board and the letter from the president report a number of such steps. To me, the steps they mention appear both appropriate and promising. They are to be applauded for taking them.
I hope and pray that Calvin College may survive this grievous blow and continue to be the creative and high-quality center for Christian learning that it has been for many years. In my informed, but admittedly not impartial, judgment, Calvin over the past quarter century or so has become the premier Christian college in the land. I hope and pray that it will continue to be that.
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